Elsa Johnson, a Stanford student and Hoover Institution researcher, was aggressively targeted by a suspected Chinese Ministry of State Security operative. What started as a friendly Instagram DM from “Charles Chen” quickly turned into visa-free trip offers, pressure to move to WeChat, and eventual transnational repression — all while universities looked the other way.
In this Based Camp episode, Malcolm and Simone Collins break down the full university-to-CCP pipeline: how massive Chinese student tuition payments create financial dependency, the role of CSSA (Chinese Students and Scholars Associations), Confucius Institutes, the United Front strategy, tech/IP theft in AI, and why American universities are failing to protect students and national security.
Show Notes
Elsa Johnson, a Stanford student, is calling attention to a toxic national security flaw playing out in American universities and the problem is so much bigger than I had imagined.
This spring, she testified before the House committee on Education and the workforce, asking them to do something about the problem
‘I exposed China’s espionage tactics in The Times. Now I’m being harassed’
What Happened to Elsa Johnson?
Elsa attended a Chinese language immersion school from kindergarten through either grade in Minneapolis, Minnesota
Got into Stanford University
Became a research assistant at the Hoover Institution, where she focused on Chinese industry and military tactics
From her congressional testimony:
“In June 2024, a few days after I spoke with one of my supervisors at Hoover about Chinese recruitment tactics targeting American academics, a man calling himself Charles Chen reached out to me on Instagram. He had over 100 mutual followers with me and had photos of Stanford on his profile. I had no reason to believe he was anything other than a fellow student.”
“Over the following weeks, Chen’s messages grew more concerning. He told me he was from China and asked detailed questions about my research and background in Chinese. He offered to pay for a trip to China, sent me a flight itinerary from Los Angeles to Shanghai and sent screenshots of a bank wire to prove he could afford my accommodations once I got there. He also sent me a document outlining a policy that would allow me to travel to China without a visa. He sent me videos of Americans who had gotten rich and famous in China and insisted that I, too, could find wealth and fame in the PRC.”
“Later on, he began incessantly pressuring me to move our conversation to WeChat, a Chinese government-monitored messaging app. When I didn’t respond to Charles Chen fast enough, he would delete and resend his messages. He even referenced the whereabouts of Stanford students who were in China at the time of our correspondence.
“Then, in July, he publicly commented on one of my Instagram posts in Mandarin, asking me to delete the screenshots I had taken of our private conversation. I had not told anyone I had taken screenshots, and I do not know how he knew. The only explanation I could come up with was that my phone or my account had been compromised somehow.”
“I contacted two China experts at Stanford whom I trusted and they connected me with an FBI contact who handled CCP-related espionage cases at the university. I met with the FBI in September and handed over everything I had. The FBI confirmed that Charles Chen had no real affiliation with Stanford. He had likely posed as a student for years and used multiple fabricated social media profiles to target students researching China-related topics. I was told he was likely operating on behalf of China’s Ministry of State Security. I later found out that I was one of at least ten other female students targeted by Charles Chen since 2020. “
She published an account of this experience in the Times of London
After that, she was followed and harassed by the CCP
“Last summer, while conducting research on China in Washington, DC, I began receiving regular phone calls from unknown US numbers. When I answered the calls in English, the callers would switch to Mandarin. In one case, the caller referenced my mother. These bizarre calls were intimidation attempts, designed to remind me that neither my family, nor I, is safe from transnational repression by the CCP.”
“Then, this past fall, the FBI informed me that I am being physically monitored on Stanford’s campus by agents of the Chinese Communist Party. They told me that my family is also at risk and is being monitored. As a 21-year-old who grew up loving the Chinese language and culture, I never imagined that studying it would put me in a position where a foreign intelligence service is tracking my movements on my own campus and monitoring my family. I fear for my safety and for my family’s safety.”
The University Problem
Universities Heavily Accepting Chinese National Students
US Universities and Private Schools
Department of Homeland Security SEVIS analysis found that 47% of all foreign K–12 students in 2019 were from China
Universities
Around one quarter of foreign (international) university students in the United States are from China.
The absolute number of Chinese students has fallen from a pre‑pandemic peak of around 370,000 in 2019 to under 280,000 in 2023–24, but China remains one of the top two sending countries (with India).
UK Universities likely accepting more Chinese students to meet visa rules
To keep their sponsor licence, universities will soon need: 95% of enrolled students to actually start their course (up from 90%), 90% to complete (up from 85%), and a visa refusal rate under 5% (down from 10%).
Because these thresholds are strict and the start date is unclear, some universities have already effectively stopped recruiting from countries with lower visa grant/compliance rates, including Bangladesh, Ghana, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Nigeria, which currently fall below the new 95% benchmark in Home Office data.
Chinese students are good with visa compliance, so they’re likely to be accepted at greater rates
This will create greater financial dependence on foreign Chinese students
The ‘Times of London discusses the problem in greater detail here.
Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs)
The CSSA the official organization for overseas Chinese students and scholars registered in most colleges and universities outside of the People’s Republic of China.
It’s described as a government-organized non-governmental organization
They were created by the CCP to monitor Chinese students and mobilize them against dissenting views, according to the U.S. State Department.
They receive guidance from the CCP through Chinese embassies and consulates, aligning their activities with Beijing’s political objectives rather than purely student interests.
They participate in the CCP’s “United Front” work, which Elsa in her testimony characterizes as using these groups as vehicles for surveillance and influence on campus.
In some cases, local Chinese consulates must approve CSSA presidential candidates, suggesting foreign government control over student leadership selections.
They may accept funding from Chinese embassies that makes up a large share of their budgets (Elsa notes Foreign Policy reporting that Georgetown’s CSSA received roughly half its annual budget from the embassy), creating financial dependence tied to political influence.
There are also Confucius Institutes at universities
Elsa testified: “A bipartisan Senate investigation found that 70 per cent of schools with a Confucius Institute [programmes which promote Chinese Language and Culture] that received more than $250,000 in a given year failed to report it properly.”
What is being done about them? In her testimony, Elsa notes: “Congressman Tim Walberg has co-signed a letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio, requesting that CSSAs be evaluated for designation as foreign missions under the Foreign Missions Act.” and calls it a step in the right direction.
She also notes “Section 117 of the Higher Education Act requires postsecondary institutions to disclose foreign gifts or contracts totalling $250,000 or more, and the Department of Education recently approved a new foreign funding reporting portal that launched earlier this year.”
“Transnational Repression”
According to a 2024 Freedom House report, “International students, visiting scholars, and faculty in the United States are being targeted by foreign governments and their agents. Tactics of transnational repression on campuses include digital and physical surveillance, harassment, assault, threats, and coercion by proxy.”
The report cites the CCP as the biggest threat, noting that:
Classroom discussions and campus events on topics like Hong Kong, Xinjiang, Tibet, or Chinese politics are monitored, with information relayed to Chinese diplomatic staff or officials via networks such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) and platforms like WeChat.
Students who organize or join protests (for example, White Paper/zero‑COVID vigils) report being filmed, shouted down, or physically intimidated by pro‑CCP students or CSSA affiliates, sometimes resulting in assaults at demonstrations.
Authorities in China contact or visit students’ family members back home to warn them about the student’s activism abroad, creating intense psychological pressure on the student to stop speaking out. [freedomhouse](https://freedomhouse.org/report/transnational-repression/2024/addressing-transnational-repression-campuses-united-states)
Pro‑CCP actors use social media and messaging apps to threaten, smear, or expose identifying information of critical students, contributing to a climate of fear and self‑censorship.
CSSAs, overseen by the CCP’s United Front Work Department and supported by Chinese diplomatic missions, monitor Chinese students, mobilize them to oppose speakers and events critical of Beijing, and help enforce informal red lines on campus speech.
Confucius Institutes and CCP‑linked programs are described as contributing to an atmosphere where students feel they must avoid sensitive topics or visible prodemocracy activity to protect their safety, immigration status, and future prospects in China.
Universities Failure to Do Much About Foreign Actors
In her testimony, Elsa notes how the FBI worked with her, but she found no support or resources from Stanford University
This could be due to financial pressures:
Chinese students have been the largest single group of international students, often about one quarter to one third of all foreign students, so they account for a disproportionate share of that high‑margin tuition revenue.
One analysis estimated that Chinese students contributed about 12 billion dollars to the U.S. economy in 2016–17 alone, with a large fraction flowing directly as tuition and fees to higher‑education institutions.
Public research universities are the most clearly exposed type of uni in the USA: when state funding fell, they grew foreign (especially Chinese) enrollment, so their budgets became partially conditioned on keeping that demand.
China’s United Front
In CCP theory, the united front is one of the Party’s three “magic weapons” for seizing and maintaining power, alongside armed struggle and Party building.
Its basic purpose is to “unite all forces that can be united” in order to neutralize opposition and build the broadest possible coalition around CCP objectives.
So it’s basically like the Urban Monoculture: Groups may be aesthetically different, but under the surface they’re the same
How it works inside China
Domestically, united front work focuses on groups the Party sees as important but not fully under its control—ethnic minorities, religious communities, private entrepreneurs, intellectuals, non‑Communist “democratic parties,” and new middle‑class and professional strata.
These groups are drawn into Party‑led institutions such as the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) and various “mass organizations,” where they get limited representation but are expected to take the CCP’s lead
Overseas and influence operations
Overseas, United Front work tries to shape foreign environments in ways favorable to the CCP by influencing Chinese diaspora communities, elites, media, academic institutions, businesses, and politicians in other countries.
Activities described by governments and researchers include promoting pro‑Beijing narratives, building relationships with foreign elites, guiding or co‑opting Chinese‑language media, gathering intelligence, facilitating illicit technology transfer, and, in some cases, interfering in foreign politics.
The AI Problem
A component of China’s AI strategy involves stealing IP from US tech companies.
Concrete AI‑related IP theft cases
Google AI trade‑secrets case (Linwei “Leon” Ding, 2024)
A Chinese national working at Google in California was arrested and charged with stealing over 500 confidential files on Google’s advanced AI infrastructure and chips.
DOJ alleges he uploaded files describing Google’s TPU‑based data center architecture and AI supercomputing platform to a personal account while secretly working for two China‑based tech startups building AI platforms and large‑model infrastructure.
FBI Director Christopher Wray framed this as part of “the lengths affiliates of companies based in the People’s Republic of China are willing to go to steal American innovation.”
Operation CuckooBees / APT41 IP theft (multi‑sector, includes tech)
Cyber firm Cybereason detailed a years‑long campaign by APT41, a state‑linked Chinese group, that exfiltrated “hundreds of gigabytes” of trade secrets, including proprietary diagrams, formulas, and manufacturing data from ~30 multinationals in technology, manufacturing, and other sectors.
While not solely “AI companies,” this shows a pattern of Chinese state actors targeting high‑value tech IP, including software and design data that could underpin AI systems.
Broader CCP cyber‑espionage targeting AI/ML sectors
CSIS analysis notes that the CCP uses cyber‑espionage and human networks to steal IP in strategic areas, explicitly including AI/ML, as part of its “Made in China 2025” industrial plan.
They emphasize that startups and small firms—exactly where cutting‑edge AI work often happens—are especially vulnerable, and that cyber operations are paired with clandestine human intelligence to extract trade secrets.
There are older non‑AI‑specific but relevant precedents (e.g., Apple self‑driving car engineer Xiaolang Zhang, various semiconductor and source‑code theft cases) involving Chinese nationals and core algorithmic or hardware IP. Those show the pattern that now appears to be extending directly into AI‑model and AI‑infrastructure theft.
Government claims about “industrial‑scale” AI theft
Recent U.S. government messaging has become much more explicit that Chinese entities are targeting American AI models and infrastructure as a systematic campaign.
White House and State Department warnings (2026)
A memo by the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy describes “industrial‑scale campaigns” by foreign actors—“predominantly from China”—aimed at appropriating U.S. AI technology, including via model distillation (training models to replicate proprietary ones).
Separately, the State Department has reportedly asked embassies and partners to warn about alleged AI theft efforts by Chinese AI firms (e.g., DeepSeek), following OpenAI’s warnings to U.S. lawmakers that DeepSeek was trying to target U.S. frontier‑model companies to replicate their systems.
Congressional findings and expert testimony (2026)
The House Select Committee on the CCP held a hearing on China and AI, where the chair stated that Chinese companies “rely on Western AI models” and are “buying what they legally can… and stealing what they cannot,” at “every layer of the AI technology stack.”
Witnesses framed theft and replication of U.S. models and tools as a central “cheat code” in China’s AI strategy.
Broader IP‑theft statistics with CCP attribution
A Homeland Security “China Threat Snapshot” notes that about 20% of U.S. companies report IP theft by PRC‑linked entities, highlighting a sustained pattern of illicit tech acquisition through hacking, phishing, and front companies.
FBI leadership has said they open a new China‑related counterintelligence case roughly every 12 hours, and estimates of total IP‑theft loss (not AI‑specific) run into the hundreds of billions annually.
Embedding or recruiting insiders in AI companies
Direct, named “spy in AI lab” cases are still rare publicly
The Google/Ding case is the clearest example of a Chinese national inside a major U.S. AI player accused of stealing AI‑specific IP while also working with China‑based companies.
Most other public cases remain in adjacent domains (chips, autonomous driving, source code), but the modus operandi—placing employees or recruiting insiders—carries over directly to AI research orgs.
Pattern of insider recruitment in high‑tech fields
CSIS and similar analyses emphasize that Chinese espionage campaigns combine cyber‑operations with “clandestine human intelligence networks” to steal trade secrets from U.S. firms in strategic sectors.
The Homeland Security “China Threat Snapshot” describes PRC‑linked actors using spear‑phishing, academic and business cover, and front companies to solicit or extract proprietary code and software from U.S. institutions, including NASA and tech firms.
While not limited to AI, this is effectively the same recruitment and infiltration toolkit that would be used to place or flip employees at AI labs.
AI‑assisted espionage operations targeting tech firms
An incident reported by Anthropic in late 2025 describes a state‑sponsored Chinese threat actor using an AI coding assistant (a Claude variant) in an “AI‑orchestrated” cyber‑espionage campaign, automating reconnaissance, exploitation, and data exfiltration across multiple sectors.
This shows Chinese operators using AI tools to scale intrusions; combined with traditional recruitment/influence ops, this increases the risk that employees at AI or cloud companies become unwitting or witting enablers.
Export‑control evasion networks around AI hardware
DOJ has charged U.S. citizens and Chinese nationals in schemes to illegally export high‑end GPUs to the PRC by routing purchases through Florida‑based front firms and re‑exporting via third countries.
These operations often rely on insiders with business roles inside U.S. companies or shell entities interacting with the AI hardware supply chain, which is adjacent to but not the same as spies directly inside research labs.
Public reporting from the intelligence community hints at more such insider or near‑insider cases than have been unsealed in court, but those details are typically classified. The pattern you do see publicly—Google/Ding, APT41 campaigns that pull source code and designs, front‑company GPU diversion—is consistent with a deliberate strategy to get inside the AI stack at multiple points rather than just scraping public models.
What Should Be Done?
Elsa in her testimony: “Stanford should establish an anonymous tip line for students facing transnational repression. Right now, a student who is being surveilled or coerced by a foreign government has nowhere to go within the university. The University of Wisconsin-Madison has already created an information guide and reporting structure that directs targeted students to relevant offices and connects them with law enforcement. Stanford should adopt this model immediately. It does not require an act of Congress.”
Seems wise to educate Americans in general about spies. “Loose lips sink ships” and all that.
Spying feels a lot like social class in the USA. We know it exists, but we pretend it does not.
Episode Transcript
Simone Collins: [00:00:00] Hello, Malcolm. I’m excited to be speaking with you today because we’re gonna talk about the university to spy for China pipeline through the lens of one young woman’s plight. Elsa Johnson is a good old-fashioned American girl. She attended a Chinese language immersion school from kindergarten through eighth grade in Minneapolis, Minnesota, and just developed this lifelong love of the Chinese language, of Mandarin, you know, o- of China in general.
She is a high achiever. She gets into Stanford University. She’s so happy. She became a research assistant at the Hoover Institution, where she studied Chinese industry and military tactics. And then here’s where things go a little sideways. So I’m gonna read a little bit from her congressional testimony because, surprise, surprise, things go so sideways that this spring she finds herself testifying to the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, asking them to do something a- about this really serious problem.
So [00:01:00] she, she said in her testimony, “In June 2024, a few days after I spoke with one of my supervisors at Hoover about Chinese recruitment tactics tarting- targeting American academics, a man calling himself Charles Chen reached out to me on Instagram. He had over 100 mutual followers with me and had photos of Stanford on his profile.
I had no reason to believe he was anything other than a fellow student. Over the following weeks, Chen’s messages grew more concerning. He told me he was from China-” And asked detailed questions about my research and background in Chinese. He offered to pay for a trip to China, send me a flight itinerary from Los Angeles to Shanghai, and sent r- screenshots of a bank wire to prove he could afford my accommodations once I got there.
He also sent me a document outlining a policy that would allow me to ch- travel to China without a visa, which is super shady, and, like, the Chinese consulate is not hard to get to from Stanford. I, I know
Malcolm Collins: [00:02:00] this. Why would they do that? Why would they have her travel without a visa? Like,
Simone Collins: presumably- I don’t know.
That, yeah, that, that whole thing is
Malcolm Collins: like- Oh, I know ... wild They didn’t want it in the American books that she had traveled to China, because then she might be easier to pick up by, like, the CIA and stuff like this as a potential spy.
Simone Collins: Oh, because it would be in her American passport. That’s right. Yeah. Okay.
“He sent me videos of Americans who had gotten rich and famous in China, and insisted that I too could find wealth and fame in the PRC. Later on, he began incessantly pressuring me to move our conversation to WeChat, a Chinese government-monitored messaging app. When I didn’t respond to Charles Chen fast enough, he would delete and resend his messages.
He even referenced the whereabouts of Stanford students who were at, in China at the time of our correspondence. Then, in July, he publicly commented on one of my Instagram posts in Mandarin, asking me to delete the screenshots I’d taken of our private conversation. I had not told anyone I had taken screenshots, and I do [00:03:00] not know how he knew.
The only explanation I could come up with was that my phone or my account had been compromised somehow.” Clearly her phone.
Malcolm Collins: Yeah.
Simone Collins: ‘Cause, yeah, it, I mean, I guess there are some banking apps that are able to detect if you’re trying to take screenshots. I know this ‘cause they’ll give you, like, a little push notification saying, “Screenshots are not authorized,” so maybe the app can pick up on that, but most likely it was her phone that was compromised.
They had, like- Yeah ... bugged her phone or something. “I contacted two China experts at Stanford whom I trusted, and they connected me with an FBI contact who handled CCP related espionage cases at the university. I met with the FBI in September and handed over everything I had. The FBI confirmed that Charles Chen had no real affiliation with Stanford.
He had likely posed as a student for years and used multiple fabricated social media profiles to target students researching China related topics. I was told he was likely operating on behalf of Chinese Ministry of State Security. I later [00:04:00] found out that I was one of at least 10 other female students targeted by Charles Chen since 2020.”
Malcolm Collins: Female students. Why always female? Are they more malleable? Are they more stupid?
Simone Collins: Oh, yeah. I mean, you know, look, you’re, you’re listening to Base Camp. You don’t need to hear him answer this.
Malcolm Collins: You don’t need to know why it was only
Simone Collins: females.
Malcolm Collins: Women. Come on.
Simone Collins: But she, so what she did ultimately was she published an account of this experience in The Times of London.
And then after that, she was followed and harassed by the CCP. And actually, the reason why she gave that testimony to Congress in the spring wasn’t, like, “Oh my God, we have a spy problem.” It was, “Oh my God, I’m so tired of being harassed by the CCP, and universities need to be better at stopping this.” It was, like, not even, like, oh, this...
‘Cause I’m, I’m over here being like, “Whoa, can we, can we, like, talk about this spy problem?” And she’s just like, “I’m just so done being harassed.”
Malcolm Collins: But- Well, I’ve pointed out that the CCP is, and a lot of people do not... Outside of TikTok, which obviously has had a huge negative effect on the United States, and Trump [00:05:00] 100% should have shut it down.
Yeah. Very stupid.
Simone Collins: Yeah.
Malcolm Collins: But he could have blamed it on the Biden administration. It would’ve been so easy.
Simone Collins: Yeah.
Malcolm Collins: Trump, you fool. Anyway. Outside of not shutting down TikTok the CCP fundamentally, like, doesn’t understand America or American culture.
Simone Collins: It really
Malcolm Collins: doesn’t. And we’ve pointed out that often their attempts to make Americans angry at America or, like, sow division in America are very different.
Russia is, like, let’s fund BLM. As we pointed out, like-
Simone Collins: Oh, Russia gets it. They know
Malcolm Collins: Like-
Simone Collins: They know
Malcolm Collins: how to do it ... nine to one, the money that they spent on the Trump presidency, which they thought would be subversive, they spent on BLM. Mm-hmm. They... Like, BLM was a Russian funded movement. Go watch our video on it.
Like, the receipts are really clear. And by the way, Russia is not our friend. Don’t make that mistake. It’s weird that anyone ever did, but you know, some people are very gullible. But anyway the CCP when they try to attack us, they don’t get it. They’re like, “America, like-” Can you really trust your government?
Here’s where the US government has lied to you, and people are like, “Yeah, I mean, [00:06:00] that checks out, right?” It’s something I didn’t know. Like, the US government lies to us all the time. Yeah. Because Americans, like in the CCP, you can’t, like, distrust your government. You can’t be like, “Oh, yeah, yeah this is the, the questions I have about my government,” you know?
But in, in in America, like, oh, this is fucking normal. And with her, the, the- they took somebody who probably... I mean, I think the reason she was on their list is she probably had anti-American or socialist sympathies, probably, like, a far progressive. And they made the mistake of deciding to harass her when they could have just kept quiet, and she probably would’ve just let it go, right?
Like, but they made it clear that they saw her as an enemy and they were gonna treat her like an enemy, which is fascinating.
Simone Collins: No, no, no, th- this is, this is far more systematic than I think you’re aware. Okay. So first I’ll describe how she was harassed. As she states in her testimony, “Last summer, while conducting research in China and Washington, DC, I began receiving regular phone calls from unknown US numbers.
When I answered the calls in English, the callers would switch to Mandarin. In one case, the caller referenced my mother. These [00:07:00] bizarre calls were intimidation attempts designed to remind me that neither my family nor I is safe from the transnational repression by the CCP. Then, this past fall, the FBI informed me that I’m being physically monitored on Stanford’s campus by agents of the Chinese Communist Party.
They told me that my family is also at risk of being monitored. As a 21-year-old who grew up loving the Chinese language and culture, I never imagined that studying it would put me in a position where foreign intelligence service is tracking my movements on my own campus and monitoring my family.
I fear for my safety and my family’s safety.” So I’m gonna get into how this is a systematic thing, but first I wanna set the
Malcolm Collins: scene. I, I want you, before you get into that, go into how they attempted to lure her. Uh-huh.
Simone Collins: I
Malcolm Collins: mean, I think that this is actually fairly interesting.
Simone Collins: Oh, yeah.
Malcolm Collins: Yeah. Like, they tried to get her into China first- Mm-hmm
just to see, like, basically-
Simone Collins: Oh, and that’s how they get you. Then this is the, this is how you get all these people who are total shills for China, even though otherwise, like, just temperamentally and politically you wouldn’t expect them to be.
Malcolm Collins: Well, yeah, Elon [00:08:00] obviously is a good example here, right? Like, that, I think this is one of his biggest blind spots.
Mm-hmm. This is, is, like, soft spot for China. But I mean, hey- I
Simone Collins: don’t know. I mean, I think, and I’m gonna get into this as well, like, there, there is- He, it would be financially unwise and, and business-wise unwise for him to come out against
Malcolm Collins: China No, no, no, no, of course. But I mean, even in totally private conversations he’s still pro-China, right?
Like, it makes no sense to me. But I think that once you support them within a certain context publicly, which you need to to do business, and he’s done an amazing job at getting... Like Tesla’s w- I think one of the only s- in fact, i- like companies that’s really allowed to operate there independently. So he’s done a good job in, in, in regards to that.
But like, so they wanted her to get into China, right? Give her a bunch of nice stuff. The idea of her getting rich in China I think is also interesting. Yeah ... like I wonder exactly how that’s supposed to work. My best guess is what they do is they give you a bunch of assets in China that you can’t easily get out of China, so you are hugely dependent [00:09:00] financially on making sure that the CCP looks good.
Simone Collins: Yeah, possibly. I would
like
Malcolm Collins: to
Simone Collins: see- And possibly this, this could just be like how bribe payments are essentially made in many cases, where like you get a job and the job doesn’t actually do anything, but you get this really high salary for basically doing nothing, and the salary is your bribe. Yeah
so that, that could also be just kinda how it works, you know.
Malcolm Collins: Anyway, continue from here. But yeah, that, that was interesting to me as well. Like are, do people actually make this money or do they just dangle this in front of them? I would guess they probably do.
Simone Collins: Yeah.
Malcolm Collins: It’s probably worth it for the CCP to shill out money for stuff like this.
Simone Collins: Yeah. So w- why, eh, why can this even be happening on university campuses in the first place? The answer is that both private schools in the US and both public and private universities in the US kinda need Chinese students. So the Department of Homeland Security analysis it was a SEVIS analysis?
I’m not familiar with SEVIS, but anyway, that found 47% of all foreign K12 students in 2019 were from [00:10:00] China. That number went down after the pandemic, but- Mm ... if almost half of private school foreign students, and basically all foreign students in the United States who are K12 are private because public schools don’t really take foreign students th- who aren’t like refugees or illegal immigrants you know, like visiting-
Malcolm Collins: I mean, obviously, yeah, yeah, of course
Simone Collins: Are... That, that, that’s huge. Universities also have incredibly high numbers of Chinese students. About one quarter of foreign, that is to say international university students in the United States are from China. The absolute number of Chinese students has fallen from the pre-pandemic peak of around 370,000 in 200- 2019 to under 280,000 in like 2023 to ‘24.
But China remains one of the top two sending countries, alongside India. And I mean, yes, they’re very, very populous countries, but basically if, if US universities were to stop accepting Chinese students [00:11:00] they would be seeing a pretty significant gap in funding. This is also an issue in the United Kingdom.
I- in fact, the United Kingdom is likely to now accept more Chinese st- international students and accept fewer students from some other countries because in order to keep their sponsor license that allows them to basically give visas... Like, I’m sure you remember when you went to St. Andrews and when I went to Cambridge, we had to get those universities to sponsor our visas as students.
Malcolm Collins: Yeah.
Simone Collins: So to keep their sponsor licenses, universities in the UK soon need 95% of enrolled students to actually start their course. This is up from 90%. And then they also need 90% to complete, up from 85%. And they need a visa refusal rate under 5%. That’s down from 10%. And because these thresholds are really strict, and they’re not really sure when they’re gonna start to be imposed, some universities are already no longer f- recruiting from countries that have lower visa grant or compliance rates.
And that includes [00:12:00] Bangladesh, Ghana, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Nigeria. And that means that they’re gonna be turning a lot more to China because they’re very good with visa
Malcolm Collins: compliance. That’s fascinating- Yeah ... but also stupid. So at St. Andrews- ... one of the things I remember about the Chinese students, they were the most likely to drop out.
Simone Collins: That’s really interesting. Yeah. There was one... There were two Chinese students in my, my graduate class. And one I think just maybe didn’t complete the course and, and really struggled with English.
Malcolm Collins: This is what we saw as well at, at St. Andrews is they, they, they typically didn’t really understand English.
And, like, it was weird that they would attempt to go to an English school without understanding English. I mean, maybe they had, they had thought that this worked in China. And, and th- this is regular for Chinese students at top universities like Cambridge and St. Andrews.
Simone Collins: Yeah.
Malcolm Collins: Is that they go and it’s clear that they’re not close to understanding English.
Yeah. Like, they can’t have a casual conversation. And that’s gonna make it extremely hard to do well in school.
Simone Collins: But they’re still [00:13:00] accepted at super high rates because when and this is the same even for, like, US schools
Malcolm Collins: the- Hold, hold on. Actually side note here. I, I should be clear, this isn’t true of any other national group that I was aware of in the UK.
Oh,
Simone Collins: same. Yeah. No, dude, dude, dude. I- Yeah, there were lots of other international students in my Cambridge class. And also in my undergraduate. Yeah, yeah. Oh, at GWU especially, like in Washington, DC, so many kids. That was the first time I ever met someone from Kazakhstan. That was my first time ever meeting someone from so many countries.
Malcolm Collins: Yeah, yeah, yeah. You’ll meet people from Kazakhstan, from Pakistan, and from the, the, you know, all over Africa. And like-
Simone Collins: Yeah ...
Malcolm Collins: none of them ever had any problem speaking English.
Simone Collins: Nobody. Nobody. Yeah. Nobody. It was only ever China. That is
Malcolm Collins: weird. It was only ever the Chinese.
Simone Collins: My God, though, you’re so right. What’s up with that?
Malcolm Collins: I-
Simone Collins: I mean, the languages are very different, to be fair. Like, it’s very, it’s pretty easy to, like, well, relatively speaking, learn another Romance language.
Malcolm Collins: I think it might have to do with the way that corruption in their education system [00:14:00] works- Maybe ... and that they don’t actually think that they actually need to know a thing to know a thing.
Maybe. They, they think that there is a way to, to, to cheat around it, which,
Simone Collins: But yeah, like, the Korean students spoke, We had a Korean I, I mean, I obviously had, like, Korean foreign nationals in both under- undergraduate and in my graduate classes. They were perfect English. Japanese as well. That, that is...
Yeah, so it’s not even like, oh, well, they have a different alphabet. They have different... Huh.
Malcolm Collins: Yeah. Yes, it was true in my boarding schools as well, is that we had a, a bunch of- Weird ... Korean kids and they all spoke perfect English. Yeah. And we had Chinese kids and they didn’t speak English very well.
Simone Collins: Weird. Weird, weird. So but the, the-
Malcolm Collins: Not just weird. There’s something to take away from this, which is I think that their education system is so corrupted that they genuinely dissociate actually needing to know a thing- I don’t,
Simone Collins: I don’t know if that’s it ... from knowing a thing. I, I mean, we, there are other things going on with, like, money laundering, where it’s a lot easier to do it if you have a student who has a visa or something like that.
Like, we know through both surrogacy and through foreign- Sure ... [00:15:00] students, a lot of Chinese families will launder money through real estate and other things. And so for that reason, it doesn’t really matter if your Chinese student is learning something or getting good grades at university. What matters is that you’re offshoring money, so who cares?
True. I, I think that has more to do with it than anything else, if we’re being honest. Like, everyone else is there to learn, and then we got some kids over here who are here to just launder money. Whatever. It’s fine. And the university-
Malcolm Collins: They’re, they’re good learning is, is getting that money flow
Simone Collins: they roll over and take it, because in the end, foreign students pay, you know, either, you know, foreign tuition fees, out-of-state tuition fees that especially state-funded universities really need. So even in the United States, universities that are uniquely vulnerable and, like, in to this dynamic and in need of these foreign students are often state universities who, you know, especially as states face funding [00:16:00] cuts, really need the money from not only out of states, but especially foreign students.
And Chinese students are, you know, happy to, to fill those gaps. So it’s very hard to talk to a university about, like, “Hey, hey, maybe, you know, can you, like, scrutinize this group a little more? Can you, like, l- run an inquiry into some harassment campaigns going on on campus?” Because There is, and we’re, we’re gonna talk about it, going to be in reaction this huge, you know, ruffled feathers and, and then big threats of basically money just disappearing, vaporizing, that the universities increasingly need.
And also keep in mind the demographic headwinds that are facing universities. Universities are shutting down across the United States every single year. This is a game of life and death. They are dying. They cannot afford any hit to their financial income. So this idea that they might do something that would anger one of their most valuable, most hiring, [00:17:00] high-paying student classes, like- True
they can’t. Which is kind of why it was this exercise in frustration that poor Elsa decided to testify in front of Congress. Anyway, one of the primary, and this is interesting to me, bodies through which the CCP enacts its agenda- Yeah ... in universities is called the CSSA. It’s the Chinese Students and Scholars Association.
It’s, it’s basically the official organization for overseas Chinese students and it’s registered at most colleges and universities that are outside of China, so this is an international thing. Yeah. It’s described by, like, journalists and activist groups as a m- government organized, non-government organization.
So it’s an NGO, but it was, that was created by the CCP. Really?
Yeah. They, they, they basically though and this is something also that Elsa argues in her testimony to Congress, they were created by the CCP to [00:18:00] monitor Chinese students abroad and mobilize them against dissenting views. And that, that is also something the State Department alleges.
They receive guidance, so these, like... It’s basically like student clubs and orgs receive guidance from the CCP through Chinese embassies and consulates and then they align their activities with Beijing’s political objectives rather than just, like, oh, like, you know, the students are into this thing.
Like, we’re gonna have a picnic. It’s more like, well, China says do this, and so they do that. They, they participate in the CCP’s United Front work. More on that later. And this also involves using students and groups for surveillance and also for influence on
Malcolm Collins: campus. Well, they also use it for harassment campaigns and stuff like this.
It’s been like very aggressive. Like, there’s been some instances in, like, Australia and stuff like that where some students who are from China will attempt to protest China, and these people will like, really aggressively go after them.
Simone Collins: Yeah, they’ll make note of them. They [00:19:00] will counter-protest. They will make them feel very uncomfortable.
And in some cases, local Chinese consulates have to approve CSSA presidential candidates. So they’re not even, like, privately governed or, like, student-only governed. They have to, like, get, like, a write-off from the embassies. That, that is
Malcolm Collins: incredibly-
Simone Collins: And they also accept funding ... spooky. I, it’s, yeah, it, this is, it’s, it’s, it’s weird that, like, there’s a-
Malcolm Collins: Yeah, th- this is allowed, and that the US government is just like, “Sure, whatever, you know, keep going.”
Simone Collins: Yeah. And- Because also, like, universities, this is where tech transfer takes place. This is where research takes place. Like, these are our nation’s centers for tech and scientific development.
Malcolm Collins: The administration should get in on this. I can see why the progressives wouldn’t wanna get on this, but, like, we certainly should.
Simone Collins: It’s a, it’s a national security risk, and that’s why I’m like, “Oh, this is something I’ve, I’m surprised is happening.” I mean, I, I, I 100% understand the dynamics at play given the financial incentives and that universities are boned.
Malcolm Collins: Right, but, [00:20:00] like, we’re okay with universities going out of business, you know?
Yeah, so- Yeah ... screw ‘em.
Simone Collins: Yeah, but Stanford University’s still, like, a hub, and it’s also, you know, in the, in the, the hotbed of AI development and Silicon Valley in general, and I’m, I’m gonna also touch on that. There are also these Confucius Institutes at universities, and Elsa testified about those, too.
She said, quote, “A bipartisan Senate investigation found that 70% of schools with a Confucius Institute,” these are programs that promote Chinese language and culture, “that received more than $250,000 in a given year failed to report it properly.” ‘Cause there are these reporting requirements. Yeah.
But they’re just not, they’re just not bothering, ‘cause, you know, like, no one- No one do. Yeah, on, like, what laws? No one... Who, who, who’s checking anymore? No one checks. The mods are asleep. That is, like, the big thing with society these days. So Elsa does note in her testimony- The
Malcolm Collins: mods are asleep in society.
That is so true.
Simone Collins: Yeah, and it’s very scary. [00:21:00] She, she notes in her testimony saying, quote, “Congressman Tim Walberg has co-signed a letter to the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, requesting that CSSAs be evaluated for designation as foreign missions under the Foreign Missions Act.” And she, she calls that a step in the right direction.
But oh my God. What, no, no, no. You don’t know. A step in the right direction isn’t, like, a letter, a, a, a co-signed letter to the Secretary of State. The, he, he posted a comment. It’s, it’s like someone posting a comment on this video being like, “Oh, it’s a step in the right direction.” I mean, like, we read the comments, and thank you so much.
Yeah. And, and we, we love your feedback, but, like, don’t think that leaving a comment on anyone’s video or sending anyone a letter is gonna change the world. Like- and so basically nothing’s being done. I mean, she does also note that Section 117 of the Higher Education Act requires post-secondary institutions to disclose foreign gifts or contracts totaling $250,000 or more, and the [00:22:00] Department of Education recently approved a new foreign funding reporting portal that launched earlier this year so people can actually see.
But as she also pointed out in her testimony, the Confucius Institute, like 70% of the time doesn’t even report. Like no, you know, no one’s- Yeah ... no one’s actually enforcing these rules.
Malcolm Collins: Right, so why don’t they shut it down if it’s not reporting? I do not understand how lax our legal system is.
Simone Collins: Well, who’s gonna pay for someone to actually check, you know?
There, there’s that.
Malcolm Collins: So- Well, how do they know 70% of the time it doesn’t report it unless they have checked?
Simone Collins: Well, they, they must have done just specifically with the Confucius Institute a spot check, you know, some sort of audit.
Malcolm Collins: So- Well, then shut it down.
Simone Collins: I, I know. Well, but no, because I’m sure they got tons of pushback from universities who are like, “Yeah, by the way, if you do that I’m going bankrupt, so can you not?”
Like, it’s very complicated. Yeah, like
Malcolm Collins: we, we, we survive off of the Chinese spies. That’s like our major source of income these days. Yeah,
Simone Collins: like, “Just don’t go, please,
Malcolm Collins: stop.” The US students don’t want our fancy degrees anymore, you know? In China, they’ll still pay for them. [00:23:00]
Simone Collins: Yeah. Well, yeah, for, for money laundering purposes.
Anyway this whole thing though about transnational repression, I hear about it every now and then. I’m kind of on the fence about it. ‘Cause like-
Malcolm Collins: Okay, do you think it’s a good idea? We should get into more transnational repression? No,
Simone Collins: I just, I feel like they could do a better job. Maybe it’s that we’re, we’re harassed so much where I’m just like, I’m so unfazed by it.
You know, someone, someone new being like, “I’m gonna have your children taken away from you. I’m gonna attack you with a baseball bat. I’m gonna find, you know, like, I know where you live. I’m gonna...” You know, like all these things, like, I’m kinda like, “Eh.”
Malcolm Collins: So you think just like Blue Sky is better at this than China is?
Simone Collins: Yeah. Like, I don’t know, it’s just like everyone’s, everyone’s gonna, you know, making all these threats and actually, you know, following through with them. But you heard- Did you see like someone, another attempted Trump assassin was found on the streets of DC again today? Like, what? It... So anyway though, anyway.
Malcolm Collins: So hold on. Have, have you heard the the plan in Brussels, and they did like a 74-page report on this- Ugh ... so like who [00:24:00] knows, it could move ahead.
Simone Collins: Yeah.
Malcolm Collins: Where they want to merge Blue Sky and X to force X users to see Blue Sky posts. But, a- and Mastodon as well, but potentially not the other way around, just ‘cause they’re so mad that all of their little foot soldiers have isolated themselves.
Simone Collins: That’s really cute. I don’t know, that’s, that’s so cute. Like that level of like, Umbridge and, and, and bristling resentment is beautiful
Malcolm Collins: It’s like X in the users where it’s like, “I consent. I consent.” And then Brussels over the shoulder like, “I don’t.”
Simone Collins: It’s good. That’s good. Transnational repression.
So this is, this is the thing that Elsa’s complaining about. Not the spies ‘cause forget that. It’s, it’s the repression. Sure, of course. According to a 2024 Freedom House report, which is, is, it’s something she cites in her testimony, international students, visiting scholars, and faculty in the United States are being targeted by foreign governments and their agents.
Tactics of transnational [00:25:00] repression on campuses include digital and physical surveillance, harassment, assault, threats, and coercion by proxy. And while they cite, I think, 38 countries that are found to do this, it’s just like, “Hey, let’s bully our citizens abroad,” the CCP’s obviously the number-one for, like, country doing
Malcolm Collins: this Oh, yeah.
I mean, they’re great at
Simone Collins: it So here are the things that they do. They classroom discussions and campus events on topics like Hong Kong or Xinjiang or Tibet or Chinese politics, they’re monitored, and then the information is relayed to Chinese diplomatic staff or officials via networks such as Chinese students and scholars associations and platforms like WeChat.
And then students who organize or join protests, to your point, Malcolm, like, the white paper protests or the zero COVID vigils, report being filmed and shouted down or physically intimidated by pro-CCP students or CSSA affiliates, and sometimes this results in assaults [00:26:00] or other, you know, shout, shouting matches at, at demonstrations.
Though I think if you show up to a freaking protest, accept, expect that. But- Yeah, expect
Malcolm Collins: a shouting match. Come on. That’s- Yeah ... I mean, we’re gonna complain about
Simone Collins: that. Authorities in China will also contact or visit students’ family members back home to warn them about the student’s activism abroad, creating this intense psychological pressure on the student who’s, you know, speaking out.
Their parents are gonna call freaked out to be like, “What are you doing?” And that would genuinely have me scared, ‘cause China does disappear people, and that would be enough for me. So that’s, that’s for real. It is scary if you’re actually a Chinese citizen who has family in China.
Malcolm Collins: Oh,
Simone Collins: absolutely,
Malcolm Collins: yeah. And
Simone Collins: then pro-CCP actors will also use social media and messaging apps to threaten or smear or expose students who are, are critical of the CCP.
So, you know, you might also, if you have any dirt on you, you know, God help you. CSSAs are also, known for monitoring Chinese students, and they mobilize them to oppose speakers at events that are critical of [00:27:00] Beijing, and they also just help to inform students’ choices. Like apparently a lot of Chinese students are just less likely to take courses that might, might steer them in the wrong direction vis-a-vis CCP stances.
And then also the Confucius Institutes and CCP linked programs contribute to this atmosphere where students just avoid any sensitive topics or pro-democracy activity just to protect their, their, their safety. So, in, in her testimony, Elsa talks about how like the FBI would actively work with her and be like, “Yeah, we, we see people are following you around campus,” but Stanford basically did nothing, and she’s very, very angry about this, and I, I can understand why.
And obviously this is due to financial pressure that... And one analysis found that Chinese students contributed around $12 billion to the US economy in 2016 to 2017 alone. Well, I mean- And then a
Malcolm Collins: large- The, the, keep in mind how effing crazy this is. This isn’t a student [00:28:00] saying like, “I’m being harassed.”
Simone Collins: Yeah.
Malcolm Collins: This is a student being, saying, “I have a note from the FBI saying I’m being harassed on campus. Can we do something about this?”
Simone Collins: Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. And, and you know, so what, a, a thing that she points out, which is interesting to me, and I don’t know why specifically this university is doing it, but she points out that the University of Wisconsin-Madison has already created an information guide and reporting structure that directs targeted students to relevant offices and connects them with law enforcement, and she wants Stanford to just do the same thing.
She’s like, “This doesn’t require a congressional act. Like Stanford, please.” But good for you, University of Wisconsin-Madison. I don’t know why you have such a-
Malcolm Collins: It’s a good school. I seriously considered it before I got into St. Andrew’s.
Simone Collins: I don’t know anything about it. But-
Malcolm Collins: It’s just a, the high quality state school
it’s
Simone Collins: just good? So-
Malcolm Collins: It, it’s also where they went to in That ‘70s Show.
Simone Collins: Oh, I, I didn’t watch that show ‘cause I can’t stand ‘70s aesthetics, so that makes sense. The, the big element of this, and why this is [00:29:00] happening, and, and why I think we should acknowledge this and understand this, is that the, the, there’s one of the three magic weapons of CCP theory is this united front.
It, it’s about basically seizing and maintaining power, and it, it’s supposed to basically unite all fronts that can be united. So this is part of a very concerted and presumably well-funded strategy. And the idea is to unite all fronts that can be united in order to neutralize opposition and build the broadest possible coalition of around CCP objectives.
It’s basically, you know how you described the urban monoculture as being this, this this culture that says that it, like, accepts diversity, and it tries to be, you know, as inclusive as possible- Mm-hmm ... and everyone should be, you know, a member, and you could be from any religious background, but then if you scratch just beneath the surface, everyone has exactly the same views and values?
Malcolm Collins: Yeah.
Simone Collins: That’s kind of what [00:30:00] they’re going for. So domestically, the United Front focuses on groups that the party sees as important but not fully under its control, like ethnic minorities or religious communities or private entrepreneurs or intellectuals or non-communist democratic parties, the new middle class, the professional strata.
And then they try to draw these groups that are not, like, CCP hardliners into party-led institutions such as the Chinese People’s Political Consult- Mm ... Consultative Conference and various other mass organizations where they get limited representation, but they’re expected to take the CCP’s lead. So they’re basically like, “Yes,” like, “United Front, let’s all be together,” but, like, let’s be clear, you’re gonna toe the line.
And again, that’s, it’s just very urban monoculture coded to me. Overseas though, the way that this works is they try to shape foreign environments in ways that are favorable to the CCP by influencing the Chinese diaspora communities, and also elites and media and [00:31:00] academic institutions, and businesses and politicians in other countries.
And the activities described by governments and researchers who are looking into the effects of the United Front’s strategy include promoting pro-Beijing narratives and building relationships with foreign elites, like Elon Musk, or guiding or co-opting Chinese language media, gathering intelligence, facilitating ilicit- illicit technology transfer and in some cases interfering in, in foreign politics.
Not as effectively as Russia does, in our opinion, but you know, it’s, it’s a thing. And definitely these, these student orgs that are very active at universities are a, a meaningful branch of this. The fact that embassies are funneling money to them, which is not being reported, and even sometimes approving their presidents, is just enough, enough for me to be like, “Okay, this is just a clear and organized strategy.”
And I do think that universities should be, like, clear to people about this. Like, “Hey, our university is a place that is [00:32:00] contributing to the technological and scientific advancement of our country.” Yeah. “And also, there are foreign national organizations that are at this university that are trying to basically, like-” send all that information to their country.
And let’s just be aware of that as a thing. Remember, like, there used to be these posters, like, “Loose lips sink ships.” You know, we used to talk about this culturally as a, as a country.
Malcolm Collins: But I just don’t know if, like, you can sell that to the type of person who works at an AI company.
Simone Collins: And that’s a big concern ‘Cause there already have been concrete AI IP-related theft cases and Chinese nationals.
So a Chinese national working at Google in California was arrested in 2024 and charged with stealing over 500 confidential files on Google’s advanced AI infrastructure and chips. On Google. Like, Google, they’re, they have, they’re not messing around. Like, they’re not a, a, a fly-by-night seat-of-the-pants, like, AI [00:33:00] startup in the same way like I- Yeah
I as, like, Anthropic, right? Like, they’re, they’re careful now. They are. But, you know, maybe they’d make a mistake. Google, though? I mean, they have, like, the big money. But the DOJ alleges that this guy uploaded files describing Google’s TPU-based data center architecture and AI supercomputing platform to a personal account while secretly working for two Chinese-based China-based tech startups, and building AI platforms and large model infrastructure.
The FBI director, Christopher Wray, framed this as part of the lengths affiliates of companies based in the People’s Republic of China are willing to go to steal American innovation. They, so it is clear. I mean, like, everyone knows, ‘cause this is just China’s, like, overtly open strategy with regard to, like, mm, putting it diplomatically, tech transfer, is-
Malcolm Collins: Yeah
Simone Collins: they will steal American tech and/or reverse engineer it, which is what’s really been happening mostly with with Claude and [00:34:00] with OpenAI-related IP. They seem to just mostly be reverse engineering it for now. But their whole strategy is, “Yeah, we’re just gonna steal it.” China is doing many other interesting things in AI innovation with a, a, a really heavy focus, per what I’ve read and heard from some insiders, on, like, robotics.
So they’re, they’re doing, they’re doing innovative stuff, too, and, but they’re still totally sticking to their old tried and true just copy it and steal it strategy, and they should ‘cause it has worked well for them.
Malcolm Collins: Yeah, it’s, it’s worked well so far. I mean, it’s- Yeah ... it’s, it’s, long term it might not...
I mean, o- obviously their country’s sort of falling apart right now, which is, you know, whatever.
Simone Collins: Yeah, but, you know, they then more than anyone else needs the deus ex machina of AI and of tech to fix the problem. So they are extra in... They’re extra incentivized to steal tech. And the, the US government on many fronts, I’m not gonna read all of them that, that I pulled up is, is very explicit about the [00:35:00] fact that this is a major security risk.
And this is one of the big themes of AI, is, like, who’s gonna have AGI first? Who’s gonna have, like, the- Yeah ... the ultimate AI weapon? The House Select Committee on the CCP held a hearing on China- And AI this year where the chair stated that Chinese companies, quote, “Rely on Western AI models,” end quote, and are buying what they legally can and stealing what they cannot at every layer of the technology stack.
Witnesses framed theft and replication of US models and tools as a central cheat code in AI strategy. And most of the cases in which AI, A- IP has been stolen just aren’t public because frankly they’re so embarrassing and so dangerous, Yeah ... that they just don’t want things to come out. Now to be fair OpenAI especially after sort of coming...
They had, like, this come to Jesus moment when, when DeepSeek first, like, I guess hit the market and everyone was like, “Oh my God.” They, they got really public about how important it was [00:36:00] to protect themselves, I guess. And they have, like, biometrics protected rooms with, like, you have to do a retinal scan- Yeah
or whatever. But it’s only a matter of time until this stuff is stolen, and I, I just feel like people should be a little bit more aware of the fact that spying is actively happening. Malcolm and I actually, like, y- you and I, Malcolm- This is why you can- ... we’re pretty open about spies ...
Malcolm Collins: trust Chinese people.
They all might be spies. That’s what she’s saying.
Simone Collins: Well, we, we’ve been accused of being spies. We’ve been, like-
Malcolm Collins: Yeah, we’ve been accused of being spies
Simone Collins: for Israel. We, we joke about it all the time, but also, like, jokes aside now, I’m kind of like, “Oh, God,” you know?
Malcolm Collins: This is actually
Simone Collins: a problem. Why do all the
Malcolm Collins: other spies get money and not us?
Simone Collins: Yeah, no one’s promising us fancy s- spy jobs.
Malcolm Collins: CCC, I am so cheap. You support my family-
Simone Collins: We, yeah, we wanna be spy family. Make, make us the real spy family ...
Malcolm Collins: I will, I will not send you like, confidential information ‘cause I don’t have access to it, but I can at least stop [00:37:00] saying bad things about you for a little bit of money.
Simone Collins: Yeah. Yeah, we’ll be paid shills. We’ll, we’ll, we’ll, we’ll help with the united front. We would be such bad shills for China.
Malcolm Collins: It’s true.
Simone Collins: We’d be really... No, like, we’d be legit bad shills for China. We’d be really bad shills for Europe. I’m trying to think who could actually, like-
Malcolm Collins: Israel could pay us. We’d be decent enough.
Just stop doing the, the, the meme videos.
Simone Collins: Yeah. Well, remember when Qatar was gonna fly us out to one of the, the Doha debates?
Malcolm Collins: Yeah, I, I, I d- I do, I’d stay in
Simone Collins: Doha. And then, and then, no, immediately, like, in our next few podcasts, you’re like, “Ugh, Qatar’s so whatever.” I can’t even remember what you said about them that was not flattering, but, like, you can’t help, you can’t help but, like, anti-shill for people.
And, and that robbed us of a potential-
Malcolm Collins: I don’t think that
Simone Collins: has anything to do with it ...
Malcolm Collins: business class flight.
Simone Collins: Oh, well. Well, I like fancy flights. I like fancy things.
Malcolm Collins: Anyway, let me [00:38:00] see-
Simone Collins: I, I’m literally covered in infant urine right now. It’s, she needs a break. She needs some bribery. She needs some grease payments.
Speaker 3: Speaking of grease payments, if you’re wondering why we don’t have a reform video going live today, we did. We filmed it. We even filmed it over the weekend. It was kids crawling over us and everything, but the video got corrupted somehow. So I’m going to be putting it on our paid Substack and Patreon immediately.
I’m sorry about that, guys. I want to have it here, but it’s going to perform terribly in the algo because it starts without my video even working, and we had no idea. Obviously, it’s a big change, and I would just film one today that we could have go live tomorrow when it’s still relevant, but we have a news crew coming over today, so we can’t do that.
So sorry about that, guys. But hey, excuse to give us money.
Money, please.
Speaker 4: Oh, no. No. There’s no money.
Speaker 3: Money, please, money. Please.
Malcolm Collins: Well, let’s, let’s end early today. Get [00:39:00] started early ‘cause I’m also about to fall asleep. That’s why I was eating those jelly beans, trying to get a little bit of sugar to keep me awake
Simone Collins: for- Oh, I’m so sorry I bore you to death with my- My, my grating female voice. I’m sorry, guys. I know, you had to listen to the, the female today.
I’m
Malcolm Collins: just, I’m just getting up so much earlier these days, you know?
Simone Collins: Yeah. No, Malcolm is, Sorry, guys. He’s still not getting sleep. Okay, then I will, Are you gonna go buy your potato and your
Malcolm Collins: shallots? Yes, ‘cause I wanna taste v- v- forest-found soup.
Simone Collins: Foraged. Well, oh, yeah. Then it’s an invasive species from China, right?
Malcolm Collins: Yes, China. All right. We gotta get rid of this Chinese mushrooms.
Simone Collins: Golden oyster mushrooms. Yeah, so thematic, I guess. Yeah. Nothing, nothing says- I love
Malcolm Collins: you, Simone.
Simone Collins: I love you, too. Don’t... Do you want me to pick up your food so you don’t fall asleep at the wheel?
Malcolm Collins: I’ll make it.
Simone Collins: I don’t, I don’t like those [00:40:00] odds.
“I’ll make it.” That’s not what you wanna hear.
Malcolm Collins: I had a bunch of jelly beans. I’m up. I’m up. I’m up.
Simone Collins: I don’t know what flavor.
Malcolm Collins: All the flavors. That’s the freaking point of jelly beans, all the flavors.
Simone Collins: Man, I fill our grocery cart with, like, apples, and bananas, and broccoli, and cauliflower, and then I see this giant container of jelly beams, as Titan calls them.
Jelly beams. Jelly beams. Octavian still calls them his blanket Blankwet. Blankwet.
Malcolm Collins: Blankwet. Blank-
Simone Collins: Blankwet.
Malcolm Collins: The day he told us about how he’s gonna have a Chinook helicopter move the house to the woods.
Simone Collins: Yeah. ‘Cause-
Malcolm Collins: Simone found a spot she thought was beautiful in the woods.
Simone Collins: I... That spot is perfect.
Malcolm Collins: And so he says it’ll bring the house and it’ll bring the teddy bear in the house over so we don’t have to worry about that.
Simone Collins: [00:41:00] Well, and we’re also gonna buy vans and then drive them into the Chinook helicopter, and the kids will be in the vans when they drive. Yeah. It’s a whole thing. He also said today he was gonna, he was gonna move the climbing dome over, the, the one that we got.
Malcolm Collins: Oh, he did? Okay. Yeah. That’s good. That’s good.
Simone Collins: So it, it is done.
He’s
Malcolm Collins: gonna have everything he needs down there. That’s funny, the idea of, like, moving the climbing dome in
Simone Collins: the... The whole, the whole house.
Malcolm Collins: Yeah.
Simone Collins: No, he’s... He thought about it a lot. He’s like, “How much does our house weigh?” He’s trying to figure it out. I think the, the the average house weighs, a- according to Alexa, around 300 and- 300,000 pounds.
So our m- ours must weigh a lot more, ‘cause the average American house now is made out of, like, particle board and sawdust. So- Yeah ... ours, made out of all this, like, local stone, has to be a lot more. It has to weigh a lot more.
Malcolm Collins: I think it’s gonna be harder to move in a Chinook helicopter.
Simone Collins: I think it’s gonna fall apart, Malcolm.
I think Octavian’s gonna break our [00:42:00] house with his Chinook helicopter. But whatever, you know. Then we’ll have a Chinook helicopter. He just wants to live in a helicopter anyway, so it’s fine. Sorry, I’ll let you get your potato. Go. I love you. Don’t die.
Malcolm Collins: Did you see the recipe? Is it doable?
Simone Collins: Oh.
Malcolm Collins: We’ll do it with coconut milk with my plan, ‘cause I said that’ll give it a more luxurious taste.
Simone Collins: Ah.
Malcolm Collins: The part you- Per year
Simone Collins: now ...
Malcolm Collins: you can skip is the making the broth.
Simone Collins: This is so written by AI. Because no one, no one would say 700 to 900 grams fresh golden oyster mushrooms. The more the better. They carry the show. Use mostly caps. Save some stems for broth. That’s ‘cause I got
Malcolm Collins: mad at it the first time. It was like, “Chop up some oyster mushrooms and then put it in a mushroom bo- broth.”
And I’m like, “I don’t want a freaking canned mushroom broth for my mushroom soup.”
Simone Collins: Ew. Yeah, that’s disgusting. Yukon [00:43:00] Gold potato, peeled and diced. N- this might take a really long time to bring to a simmer, 15 to 20 minutes. Oh, I guess if you go now and I start right away. Oh, blend. Oh yeah, we’re pureeing it.
Malcolm Collins: Pureeing the what?
Simone Collins: The
Malcolm Collins: soup. Which part of it?
Simone Collins: The whole thing.
Malcolm Collins: Does it say blend at the end? Because it certainly- Yeah ... doesn’t say blend at the beginning.
Simone Collins: Yeah, it blends at the end and you f- oh, you’re gonna need cream. I-
Malcolm Collins: It always says you can use coconut milk instead of cream.
Simone Collins: Oh, okay, yeah.
Malcolm Collins: Very explicitly.
Simone Collins: Mushrooms, blah, blah, blah. Blah, blah, blah. Yeah. Full blend potato plus cream. Yeah. Yeah, it’s, it’s a, it’s a cream of mushroom
soup. Yeah. Separate. So I’m sauteing the onions f- or sorry, I’m sauteing the [00:44:00] mushrooms before the first and then I put into water and then I simmer them for 20 minutes and then I s- strain and then I add a softened potato.
Malcolm Collins: Why don’t you ask for a different recipe, okay?
Simone Collins: Yeah. Did you ask Grok? Grok can’t cook.
Malcolm Collins: Go to Perplexity and ask a recipe and show me what I’m getting Gee
Simone Collins: whiz. Okay.
Malcolm Collins: You could do it right now, Simone, okay?
Simone Collins: I know.
Malcolm Collins: And ask for a-
Simone Collins: I will ...
Malcolm Collins: a cream of mushroom soup, okay? Not like a m- a normal mug, because then it’s gonna give you, like, weird...
Simone Collins: Please give me a cream of mushroom soup recipe that is compatible with foraged golden oyster mushrooms.
Perplex- why would you even ask a... No. [00:45:00] Grok is a man AI, and not, like, a chef man AI, just a normal man AI.
There we go. Okay. So we need one pound of golden oyster mushrooms. Totally have. Three tablespoons of butter, check. Olive oil, check. Medium yellow onion or two shallots diced, so we need the shallots. Garlic, have it. One cup fre- one... Oh, sorry, one teaspoon fresh thyme. We don’t necessarily need that, and I think- Yeah
we might have it dried. Kosher salt, black pepper, flour, chicken or vegetable broth. I have bouillon, which I can use. Heavy cream, half-and-half or whole milk. We have whole milk. Soy sauce or tamari. We have soy sauce at least. We might have tamari. Lemon juice or dry sherry, optional but recommended. So you prep the onions, you saute them, you build the base, you thicken it, and then you [00:46:00] blend to make a smooth soup, and then you finish gently by stirring in the cream and soy sauce.
I think this would be better with heavy cream, but- Okay.
Malcolm Collins: Do it with heavy cream ...
Simone Collins: we don’t have any heavy cream. So can you get two shallots and heavy cream?
Malcolm Collins: Yes.
Simone Collins: Beautiful.
Malcolm Collins: I love
Simone Collins: you. And if you wanna get chicken broth, you can, but we have bouillon that I can use to reconstitute broth.
Malcolm Collins: Chicken broth will probably be easier if I get it, right?
Simone Collins: Eh. You know what? We might have some. I have bouillon cubes. I really shouldn’t be lazy, so don’t... Yeah, don’t buy things. Let’s save money.
Malcolm Collins: All right, love you.
Simone Collins: I love you too.
Speaker: Can I handle that chicken for you? Oh, yeah.
I remember. Let me handle him. [00:47:00] Let me handle him. I- I’m gonna get a brown one. Let me handle him. I’m probably the one to take care of this guy by hand. Mommy, I wanted to hold a chicken. Okay, go pick one up, my love. But it’s harder. Titan seems pretty good at catching them. I wanna hold one. I’m pretty good at...
Can you?
Mommy, get a chicken right now, please. Look at all these flowers in this tree, Mommy. Wow,
Speaker 2: they’re so pretty. Get
Speaker: a chicken right
Speaker 2: now for me. Okay, I’ll see what I can do. Can
guys. Be nice. Thank you, friends. Yeah, there you go, Indy. Gently. Thank
you.
